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As of April 14, 2003, Taiwan had had 23 probable
cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 19 of
which were imported. Taiwan isolated all 23 patients in
negative-pressure rooms; extensive personal protective
equipment was used for healthcare workers and visitors.
For the first 6 weeks of the SARS outbreak, recognized
spread was limited to one healthcare worker and three
household contacts. 
T
he global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) has proceeded with unprecedented speed,
overwhelming many hospitals and some public health sys-
tems in a matter of weeks. As of April 14, 2003, a total of
3,169 cases had been reported from more than 20 coun-
tries. In many locations, the introduction of the disease by
ill travelers has soon been followed by spread to healthcare
workers and household contacts. In the most mature out-
breaks, in Hong Kong and Hanoi, 46% and 63% of cases,
respectively, were reported in healthcare workers, and hos-
pital spread has also characterized the larger outbreaks in
Singapore and Toronto (1,2). 
Taiwan, with its close proximity to the epicenters of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Guangdong
Province and Hong Kong and its extensive business and
cultural ties, has heavy travel volume from the most affect-
ed areas. The first probable SARS case-patient in Taiwan
returned from Guangdong and Hong Kong early in the
global outbreak, on February 21, 2003, and a series of
other importations have been documented since that time.
Factors that contribute to spread of infection in a given
location are not well understood but may include not only
the number of coronavirus-infected persons but also
whether any of these persons are particularly infectious,
whether they are identified early in their illness, and how
effectively they are isolated. To contribute to discussions
on how to effectively prevent transmission, we believe
reporting the early experience with limited spread of the
disease in Taiwan, along with a thorough description of the
control measures taken, is important. 
Epidemiology of SARS in Taiwan
The first recognized SARS patient in Taiwan was in a
54-year-old businessman who traveled to Guangdong
Province, China, on February 5, 2003, and returned to
Taipei by way of Hong Kong on February 21. On February
25, fever and myalgia, and later a dry cough, developed,
but he was not hospitalized until March 8. Several hours
after admission, he was intubated and required mechanical
ventilation for 13 days. During the initial hospitalization,
he was cared for in a single intensive care unit (ICU) room
by healthcare workers who used standard nursing (univer-
sal) precautions. When pneumonia was diagnosed in the
patient’s wife on the morning of March 14, both patients
were placed in isolation rooms; by the afternoon they were
isolated in ICU negative-pressure rooms with full precau-
tions, as described below. Fever developed in their son on
March 17, followed by cough on March 20; he was hospi-
talized in a negative-pressure isolation room on March 21.
The wife and son were exposed during the period before
full protective measures were in place, and SARS devel-
oped in both. Both required mechanical ventilation. The
illnesses in the wife and son were confirmed by reverse-
transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing
to be associated with the novel SARS coronavirus (3–5).
As of April 14, 23 persons in Taiwan met the World
Health Organization (WHO) criteria for a probable case of
SARS. Of these, eight had SARS-associated coronavirus
identified in throat swabs by PCR. An additional 120 reports
of possible case-patients with compatible travel or contact
were investigated, and 13 remained under investigation. Of
the probable case-patients, 19 (83%) reported travel to
mainland China and Hong Kong in the 10 days before ill-
ness onset, and 4 represented secondary spread. The patients
with secondary cases included the two family members
described above, a person who acquired it in his household
from a Hong Kong visitor (representing 13% of cases), and
a single healthcare worker (representing 4% of cases). 
The single case in a healthcare worker was in a 32-year-
old physician who cared for the wife of the initial case-
patient. On March 14, the physician had performed a chest
ultrasound that lasted approximately 30 minutes; he spent
an additional hour in the room on March 17 during and
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1On behalf of the SARS Advisory Committee.after intubation. He was at the side of the bed supervising
the intubation and in a direct line of droplet spread when
the patient had episodes of coughing, sometimes partially
sitting up. The physician reported wearing an N95 mask,
eyeglasses without goggles, two pairs of gloves, and two
gowns. His illness began on March 21, with clinical fea-
tures that met the criteria for a probable SARS case and
laboratory confirmation of coronavirus infection by RT-
PCR. None of the other five persons present in the room
for the intubation became ill after 28 days of follow-up. 
SARS Control Measures in Taiwan
Beginning with the recognition of the first SARS case
on March 14, Taiwan moved aggressively to isolate all sus-
pected or probable case-patients in negative-pressure
rooms and to equip all healthcare workers with enhanced
protective equipment. Assistance from the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was requested, and
a team has worked with Taiwan Center for Disease Control
officials since March 16 to implement a framework for
SARS control.
In March through April, 2003, Taiwan had a total of 764
negative-pressure rooms. Most were specially designed
isolation rooms with HEPA-filtered air, negative pressure
under continuous electronic monitoring, separate bath-
room, and anteroom so that two doors separate the SARS
patient from the rest of the hospital. The Center for Disease
Control in Taiwan tracked available isolation rooms on an
ongoing basis, and all of the first 23 probable case-patients
were cared for in such negative-pressure rooms, located in
15 hospitals across the island. Resources in the highly
affected areas of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Toronto may
have been quite similar or superior to those in Taiwan. In
contrast, neither of the two hospitals treating SARS
patients in Hanoi had negative-pressure rooms, and such
rooms were not commonly available in hospitals in
Thailand, Laos, or other Asian countries (T. Uyeki, M.
Simmerman, pers. comm.).  
Ateam from the Taiwan Center for Disease Control vis-
ited each of the 15 hospitals caring for SARS patients to
audit and implement strict infection control practices.
Widespread education of healthcare workers on SARS
control, with written guidelines, pictures, and demonstra-
tions, was undertaken. Full protective equipment for
healthcare workers was also widely available, and such
equipment was provided and monitored under the conser-
vative assumption, made early in the Taiwan outbreak, that
airborne or fomite transmission of the agent should be pre-
sumed until proven otherwise. In addition to the hand-
washing and barrier precautions with gown, gloves, mask,
and eye protection recommended by WHO, most health-
care workers in Taiwan used a disposable second layer of
protective clothing (outer gloves, outer gown, head and
foot covering) that were discarded before workers left the
anteroom to prevent fomite transmission to other areas.
Surgical or loose-fitting masks were actively discouraged,
and N95 or greater filtration masks with tight-fitting seals
were uniformly available. These precautions were used for
354 of 370 patient-care-days for the first 23 patients
through April 14. After SARS was identified in the physi-
cian, use of goggles rather than glasses and careful fitting
of masks were reemphasized to hospital infection control
departments. Visits by family members were prohibited or
minimized. 
Active surveillance of exposed healthcare workers and
contacts of patients was begun. In addition, the infection
control nurses at the 15 hospitals passively monitored
absenteeism in all employees. As of April 14, no other sus-
pected or probable cases of SARS were identified through
active daily monitoring of 525 healthcare workers, 210
work colleagues, 54 family and friends, and 31 public
health staff who were exposed to the first 20 case-patients.
Although some healthcare workers and household contacts
of discharged patients had ongoing contact with SARS
cases, as of this writing the outer limit of the incubation
period (14 days) had already passed for contacts of 15 of
the 23 cases, including 45 family and 220 work contacts. A
more thorough epidemiologic investigation of close con-
tacts was under way to determine the risk for transmission
by level of contact and protection.
Beginning March 28, contacts of known patients, both
suspected and probable, were quarantined at home for 10
days. As of April 14, a total of 1,572 persons had been put
on home quarantine. This included healthcare workers
exposed outside isolation settings, family and other close
contacts, and those on airplanes with ill SARS patients if
seated within three rows in front of or three rows behind a
patient. Fourteen medical personnel were quarantined
because they had had contact with two probable case-
patients before they were hospitalized, including six pres-
ent during endoscopy of one of the patients.
Conclusions 
Approximately a 2-week interval elapsed between
recognition of SARS outbreaks in Hanoi and Hong Kong
and the introduction of SARS in Taiwan, giving clinicians
and public health authorities in Taiwan some opportunity
to act with more knowledge of its infectivity and severity.
Available evidence suggests that the spread of SARS with-
in Taiwan from the known imported cases was limited dur-
ing the first 6 weeks after importation began. As occurred
in some other SARS-affected areas, Taiwan initiated a
strategy of aggressive public health measures combined
with stringent hospital infection control practices that met,
and in some instances exceeded, those recommended by
WHO or CDC. 
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early stage. Hospitals in Taiwan were able to care for all
SARS patients in individual negative-pressure rooms;
cohorting of patients in group wards was not necessary,
and hospital staffing levels were not strained, as they have
been in some cities with far more SARS patients. Also,
although surveillance for healthcare worker transmission
appeared thorough, other episodes of spread may have
been missed. Concern about stigmatization and quarantine
may have resulted in some concealment of illness not
requiring hospitalization, and persons with mild illness or
subclinical infection would not have been isolated. In part
because of the challenge of ascertaining the true extent of
transmission, health departments elsewhere have believed
the SARS epidemics to be under control, only to find later
that spread had occurred beyond what was recognized. 
Taiwan continues to identify new cases in patients who
report recent travel to mainland China and other SARS-
endemic areas. Each year, more than 4 million visits are
made by Taiwanese to mainland China for business and
tourism (Bureau of Immigration, Ministry of the Interior,
unpub. data), and the vast majority of all flights return
through Hong Kong. Although such travel is being cur-
tailed, Taiwan clearly will be at ongoing risk for importa-
tion and spread of SARS. Indeed, an apparent nosocomial
cluster in Taipei was subsequently reported and remains
under active investigation. The appearance of this cluster
is sobering and underscores the fragility of SARS control
measures in the setting of ongoing international spread of
the disease. 
Dr. Twu is currently Minister, Department of Health,
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